Are the Dodgers Efficient or Reckless Spenders? A Study of the Andrew Friedman Era P1
Dodgers’ Financial Might
The Los Angeles Dodgers, to the chagrin of a large portion of the baseball world, have won back-to-back World Series Championships. This era of Dodgers baseball has cemented itself as a dynasty, with the very real potential to add additional championships over the next several years. They have become the model franchise in baseball. And yet, this run has not come without criticism.
During this recent run, the Dodgers have been extraordinarily aggressive to acquire star-power talent to their roster to give themselves the best chance at winning. This has included offseason signings of Shohei Ohtani, Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Blake Snell, and Freddie Freeman, to name a few. It has also been through trades and contract extensions, such as Mookie Betts and Tyler Glasnow. They have utilized their large market and financial might to bring and keep players on their roster, which can be contrasted with other organizations across baseball. To examine this in detail, let’s look at the Andrew Friedman era of Dodgers baseball when it comes to two specific financial factors: Free Agency and Contract Extensions.
– The Los Angeles Dodgers have had the highest contract commitments via Free Agency and Contract Extensions (at least $3.26 billion) in all of Major League Baseball in the Andrew Friedman era.
– The Los Angeles Dodgers have committed around $500 million more on Free Agents and Contract Extensions than the 2nd highest team (the New York Mets) in the Andrew Friedman era (2015-2025).
– The Los Angeles Dodgers have at least double the amount of money committed to Free Agents and Contract Extensions than 24 MLB teams (not including NYM, PHI, SD, NYY, and BOS) in the Andrew Friedman era (2015-2025).
Common Criticism
There is no doubt the Dodgers have committed above and beyond what other teams offer in these avenues under Andrew Friedman. This has certainly caused the ire of many fans of other fanbases, who redirect the frustration over lack of spending on the Dodgers, who spend a lot more than other teams. This is not to say this is the only point of frustration; deferrals within the structures of the Dodgers contracts are often cited in similar vein, as an example. It’s also not to say there isn’t any validity into this argument.
One common attack on the Dodgers’ approach towards acquiring star talent is that the Dodgers relentlessly and (perhaps) reckless throw money around, and that is the sole cause of their success. With the large amount of money spent on acquiring talent, it’s at least a valid question to ask: Do the Dodgers recklessly throw money around to acquire talent, or are they efficient with the dollars they spend?
This is an essential question to analyze, which will help determine whether Andrew Friedman has excelled at player acquisition, or if the large financial resources have been the main rational as to his success.
Measurements for Analysis
To answer this important question, it is essential I lay the groundwork for the research I have done. I will be looking at the Andrew Friedman era of baseball (2015-2025). Below is a breakdown of my process and clarification of certain measurements:
– Contract Measurement: First, how I am measuring contracts. We are looking at Free Agents or Contract Extensions in which their contracts start anywhere between 2015-2025. For these measures, these are the contracts that are paid by a specific organization until they are traded, or their contract ends. If a player is traded prior to their original contract ends, the year in which they are traded is included in the trade. For example, Rafael Devers was traded to the San Francisco Giants 2 years into his massive contract extension. Instead of putting the full contract on the Red Sox, to measure efficiency for how he did for Boston, his contract for 2024 and 2025 will be counted. However, nothing following that will be counted. This is not a perfect measurement, as he was only in Boston for half a season in 2025. However, to provide consistency for this measurement, this was used for each team and contract.
– Contract Extensions: Contract Extensions are counted towards a player as long as they eat up at least 1 year of free agency or were originally signed to take up at least 1 year of free agency. Thus, if a player is signed to a contract extension after 2 seasons in MLB that lasts 5 years (takes up 1 year of expected free agency), this contract is included in the list. If, however, a player signs a contract with a club option that lasts in arbitration (Alex Vesia’s contract for 2025-2026, for example) but does not buy a year of free agency, that contract is not included.
– Deferrals and Luxury Tax: The total contract commitment was used to evaluate the contract. No adjustments were done to account for deferred contracts. For example, Shohei Ohtani’s contract of 10 years for $700 million was used as is and doesn’t account for the deferrals instituted for luxury tax purposes.
– WAR Measurement (fWAR) and Monetary Value: Fangraphs WAR was used to measure the value of a player during given years. This has a monetary valuation of ~$8-10 million per WAR for true value. A consistent value of $9 million per WAR was used for all years (2015-2025). No adjustment to lower that value for earlier years was used.
– Expected War (xfWAR): Based on the $9 million per fWAR valuation, an Expected Fangraphs WAR (xfWAR) metric was created. This is, based on the commitment paid through the 2025 season, how much fWAR should a team expect to get out of a player. For example, if a player is paid a 1 year, $18 million contract, that player had an xfWAR of 2.0.
– Efficiency of Contract Commitment: To measure efficiency of how well a contract is for a team, a player’s xfWAR is subtracted from their fWAR (actual WAR – expected WAR, or fWAR-xfWAR). This will be the main measurement to see how well organizations do. Take, for example, a player that signs a 1 year, $18 million contract. He has an xfWAR of 2.0. Let’s say he puts up a 1.5 fWAR during that contract. His fWAR-xfWAR was -0.5, meaning the contract had negative excess fWAR compared to expected.
Now that the metrics used for this analysis are clarified, the question remains: How have the Dodgers performed in Free Agency and Contract Extensions under the Andrew Friedman era?
Dodgers in Free Agency and Contract Extensions
After conducting my research, here are the following main takeaways of the Los Angeles Dodgers:
Free Agency and Contract Extensions
– The Dodgers have signed 63 players through Free Agency, which ranks 6th in all of MLB.
– The Dodgers have signed 15 players to Contract Extensions, which ranks 3rd in all of MLB.
– Combining both Free Agency and Contract Extensions, the Dodgers have received the highest fWAR through these means of all teams in MLB, with a total fWAR (thus far) of 207.3. This value is at least 50 fWAR higher received by an organization than 27 other MLB teams. This result isn’t completely surprising, as we have previously established that the Dodgers spend more in financial commitments than other organizations.
– When looking at the efficiency of signings (Fangraphs WAR – Expected Fangraphs WAR), the Dodgers are 5th in MLB at contract efficiency, behind only Cleveland, Tampa Bay, Atlanta, and Seattle. The 4 MLB teams the Dodgers trail are smaller markets with significantly less contract commitments and have prioritized and relied upon signing players to contract extensions over free agents.
Below is a table of how all 30 MLB Teams from 2015-2025 performed for Free Agents and Contract Extensions:
Free Agency
– Through Free Agency, the Dodgers have received the highest fWAR among all 30 MLB teams, with a total fWAR added of 120.7.
– When looking at the efficiency of signings (Fangraphs WAR – Expected Fangraphs WAR), the Dodgers are 6th in MLB at contract efficiency, behind only Tampa Bay, Texas, Pittsburgh, San Diego, and Milwaukee. Three of the five clubs ahead of the Dodgers have made 1/6th of the contract commitments that LA has in this time period, so the bar to exceed expectations is drastically lower.
Below is a table of how all 30 MLB Teams from 2015-2025 performed for Free Agents:
Contract Extensions
– Through Contract Extensions, the Dodgers have received the 4th highest fWAR among all 30 MLB teams, with a total fWAR added of 86.6. This is behind Atlanta, Cleveland and Houston.
– When looking at the efficiency of signings (Fangraphs WAR – Expected Fangraphs WAR), the Dodgers are 8th in MLB at contract efficiency, behind Cleveland, Atlanta, Seattle, Tampa Bay, Arizona, Chicago (AL), and Miami. Five of the seven teams had at least half the financial commitment in contract extensions, so the expected bar was lower for other teams to pass.
Below is a table of how all 30 MLB Teams from 2015-2025 performed for Contract Extensions:
Further Detail on Dodgers
Regardless of whether you are looking at Free Agency or Contract extensions, the Dodgers have ranked in the top ten of MLB (mostly in top 5) in both value received (fWAR) and contract efficiency (fWAR-xfWAR). An extraordinary effort by an organization that has spent vastly more than other MLB teams.
Looking at individual offseasons for the Dodgers (a player is categorized in an offseason if their contract starts that season. For example, Shohei Ohtani’s numbers all count in 2024 stats because his contract with the Dodgers started in 2024), here is how the Dodgers have fared each offseason:
The Dodgers have consistently produced positive offseasons by efficiency (fWAR-xfWAR), with ten of the eleven offseasons in the Andrew Friedman era having a fWAR-xfWAR greater than -1.5. Seven offseasons have seen positively in efficiency. To this point, the worst offseason by dollars committed in comparison to expected results was 2025, which had a fWAR-xfWAR of -10.7 (315th of 330th offseason by that metric in MLB since 2015). Andrew Friedman and the rest of the front office have consistently put up good, efficient offseasons, which has contributed to leading the Dodgers to having sustained success. They have 5 of the top 60 offseasons in all of MLB in the Andrew Friedman era (2024, 2022, 2021, 2017, and 2016).
Below are all the Free Agents and Contract Extensions that have signed in the Andrew Friedman era (per my research):
Overall Trends
This article has been primarily focused on the Los Angeles Dodgers and how they have done through Free Agency and Contract Extensions. However, there are larger takeaways the industry can make on the trends noticed during research. Below are a list of three main takeaways I had:
Free Agency is NOT the most efficient way to acquire production.
While Free Agency is a common and valuable tool for MLB front offices to use, it is not always efficient in getting the production spent vs the value returned. Here are some statistics to highlight this:
– 23 of the 30 teams had a negative fWAR-xfWAR, meaning they did not get the production they were expecting and paid for from 2015-2025.
– The average fWAR-xfWAR an MLB team received through all Free Agent signings from 2015-2025 was -13.7.
– Only 38.34% of players who signed via free agency had a positive fWAR-xfWAR. For players who signed a $100+ million contract, that percentage was higher (47.83%), but comes at a high risk of being a really bad contract (28.26% of $100+ million free agent contracts had an fWAR-xfWAR of -5 or worse).
– Only 28.13% of players who signed a $50-100 million contract via free agency had a positive fWAR-xfWAR, ten percent less than the average for all free agent signings and twenty percent less than the average for expensive free agents.
Contract Extensions, especially when you identify young talent, is well worth the cost for teams.
Contract Extensions were by far the best and most efficient way an organization received the most value per dollar spent. Here are some statistics to highlight this:
– 25 of the 30 teams had a positive fWAR-xfWAR, meaning they got the production they were expecting and paid for from 2015-2025.
– The average fWAR-xfWAR an MLB team received through all Contract Extensions from 2015-2025 was 14.1.
– 60.75% of players who signed via contract extensions had a positive fWAR-xfWAR. For players who signed a $100+ million contract, that percentage was higher, at a 62.16%.
– 35.14% of these higher contract players drastically overperformed contract worth (fWAR-xfWAR of 5 or greater), whereas only 13.51% of these players drastically underperformed contract worth (fWAR-xfWAR of -5 or less).
– All players that drastically underperformed who were signed to long-term contracts were at least 30 years old when signing the contract.
– 64.81% of players who signed a $50-100 million contract via contract extension had a positive fWAR-xfWAR, which is a higher percentage than the $100 million contracts (opposite of free agency).
Spending money does not correlate with efficiency, but spending money helps elevate the floor of production.
This point (especially the latter statement) might seem obvious, but it is so true. Spending money gives you access to talent you might otherwise not have. Even if a player underperforms what they are paid, they can still add serious value for a team. For example, if a player is paid $36 million per year, they are expected to produce 4.0 WAR. If, however, he produces 2.5 WAR in a season, that’s still a valuable asset, even if it is an underperformance of -1.5 WAR.
Below is a scatter plot comparing the financial commitment via Free Agency and Contract Extensions from 2015-2025 and the fWAR-xfWAR by team:
– This has an r^2 value of 0.003, meaning there isn’t any predictive value between a team spending money and getting value on that contract. Thus, the teams that excel in this category buck the trends. Credit to the Dodgers.
Below is a scatter plot comparing the financial commitment via Free Agency and Contract Extensions from 2015-2025 and the fWAR by team:
– This has an r^2 value of 0.610, meaning there is good predictive value between a team spending money and getting fWAR for that contract. Spending money helps build a solid foundation. The Dodgers spend the most money, so they are efficient and have a solid floor.
Conclusion
The Los Angeles Dodgers, under the leadership of Andrew Friedman, have taken an aggressive approach to acquire and retain the best talent in all of MLB. To do so, they flex their financial might. This, however, is not done with an abandonment of efficiency; rather, the Dodgers are intentional with the signings they make and expect those players to meet the expectations of their contracts. And, to the Dodgers’ credit, those players have mostly delivered to their contract potential. This exemplifies an area that has helped contribute to the dynasty that is now Dodgers baseball: an extreme attention to detail.
The Andrew Friedman era is impressive. The ability to acquire the right personnel, combined with the owners’ financial willingness to raise the floor, is impressive. It is, however, not the only area in which the Dodgers have succeeded in the Andrew Friedman era.
Part 2 to come soon…
Bonus: Top 30 Contracts in MLB from 2015-2025
Here are the top 30 contracts (thus far) by fWAR-xfWAR since 2015 (only 5 of the top 30 were free agent signings):
Bonus: Bottom 30 Contracts in MLB from 2015-2025
Here are the bottom 30 contracts (thus far) by fWAR-xfWAR since 2015 (22 of 30 were free agent signings):
Resources Used for Research
The main resources used throughout the entirety of my research were via Spotrac and Fangraphs. Here is the link to both websites:
Spotrac: https://www.spotrac.com
Fangraphs: https://www.fangraphs.com
Link to Excel File
Here is the link to the Excel file I have created containing all 30 teams’ contracts from 2015-2025. It is very possible (and perhaps likely) I missed out on a few contracts. Feel free to take a look and provide any feedback via DM to my X (@AustinBru99).
https://1drv.ms/x/c/0a138b8cc052419a/EdE_47T08VxKv4yp1kHEURUBTa43sgjfnp6l24BAL8Lwvg
